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Abstract
While the bilateral friendship between China and North Korea was solidified and
endured during the Korean war, Beijing’s ties to Pyongyang have weakened
considerably during the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula, which emerged in
October 2002. Although China is leading the six-party talks, China is still trading with
North Korea. What explains this puzzle? Is China more concerned with domestic
stability than a nuclearized North Korea? Realist theory suggests that all states are
unitary and have the same foreign policy goals, which are self-preservation and
national security without considering regime type or domestic politics. While liberal
theory suggests that domestic politics and domestic concerns influence foreign policy.
If China follows a realist foreign policy, then trade policy towards North Korea and
goals of the six-party talks would be the same. If China follows a liberal theory, then
we may observe a contradiction between trade and the goals of the six-party talks.
Through analyzing the data of China’s export trade to North Korea and China’s
statements about North Korea’s nuclear program, I hypothesize that China is more
concerned with domestic stability than the denuclearization of North Korea. From the
liberal perspective, domestic social stability is more important concern for China than
international anarchy in realist terms.
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Introduction
During the Korean War era, relations between the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) were as close as ‘lips and
teeth’, according to former People’s Liberation Army Marshall Zhu De. Under the
leadership of Deng Xiaoping, China has embraced free market and also tried to
encourage its neighbor across the Yalu River to open North Korea on business or
diplomatic missions (Savage, 2003). However, in the 21st century, due to the
continuous nuclear tests of North Korea, the relations between the two countries
finally changed, which has made China a crucial member in the international
community to restrain North Korea’s nuclear programs.
Under the control of Kim Jong Il’s regime, North Korea tested a nuclear device on
October 9, 2006. Official statements from the government of one of the permanent
five members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) claimed that the North
Korea ignored the universal opposition of the international community and flagrantly
conducted the nuclear test (Moore, 2008). Moreover, Pyongyang tested another
nuclear test in 2009, and a third in 2013, complicating Pyongyang’s relationship with
Beijing. Therefore, China began to take a more active international role in seeking a
solution to North Korean dilemma, moves which culminated in the six-party talks,
comprising North Korea, South Korea, China, the United States, Japan, and Russia
(Chou, 2005). Because of the growing sensitivity of peace and stability on the Korean
Peninsula to China’s economic and political interests, ‘China very directly exerted its
energy to kick off multilateral talks concerning the North Korean nuclear crisis’ (Chou,
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2005). According to the scholar, six-party talks not only show China’s official position
towards North Korea’s nuclear tests shifted, but also China’s relationship with North
Korea soured (Moore, 2008).
In the case of North Korean nuclear crisis, some scholars assert that China’s policy
behavior in the last five years reveals hypocrisy in North Korea’s nuclear tests. This is
because, on the one hand, China participated with Security Council members on
October 14, 2006 to condemn North Korea’s October 9 nuclear tests; while Pan (2006)
shows that China accounted for almost US$1.5 billion in the bilateral trade with North
Korea in 2005, which made China the number one source of both aid and trade with
North Korea at that time. Bajoria (2013) agrees and claims that China has been North
Korea’s most important ally, biggest trading partner and main source of food, arms
and fuel. Moreover, Nanto and Manyin (2010) also find that China has implemented
some aspects of the sanctions towards North Korea’s provocations, but Beijing has
been less strict on controlling exports to the North in order to avoid North Korea’s
economic collapse and maintain China’s regional stability.
The question of whether China is more concerned with domestic stability than a
nuclearized North Korea is important, because it can explain the reasons why China is
still trading with North Korea as a leading member of the six-party talks, which
support economic sanctions towards North Korea and ending its nuclear weapons
program. In this thesis, I address the question by presenting China’s shared goals with
the international community to open up nuclear facilities for international inspections
and stop North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Meanwhile, I will analyze what are the
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main factors that give rise to China’s unwillingness to punish North Korea and
China’s continuous trade with North Korea.
North Korea’s defiant behavior has undoubtedly resulted in China’s belief that its
influence over the country reached a dangerously low level, which aroused China’s
attempt to recover its influence over the North Korea through intensive diplomatic
pressure (Sukhee, 2013). The scholar Sukhee (2013) asserts that China is undoubtedly
playing an important role in preventing North Korea from threatening regional peace
and stability on the Korean peninsula. In addition, Scobell (2004) points out in his
monograph, China has a major stake in ensuring the continued survival of North
Korean regime and may be willing to keep guaranteeing this. Moreover, North Korea
seems destined to remain heavily dependent on China for morale support and material
assistance. In spite of this type of relationship between Pyongyang and Beijing, there
are significant limits to China’s influence on North Korea - in part due to China’s
unwillingness to apply hard pressure and in part because, even if China did apply such
pressure, North Korea might not respond in the desired manner (Scobell, 2004). This
is pertinent for China’s foreign policy towards North Korea.
According to the research, realist theory suggests that all states are unitary and have
the same foreign policy goals. They maintain that all states should concern more
about self-preservation and national security instead of considering regime type or
domestic politics. While liberal theory claims that domestic politics and domestic
concerns influence foreign policy. For some nations, domestic social stability is more
important concern than international anarchy. If China follows realist foreign policy,
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then trade policy towards North Korea and goals of the six-party talks would be the
same. If China follows liberal theory, then we may observe a contradiction between
trade and the goals of the six-party talks. The purpose of this study is to explain the
puzzle: although China is leading the six-party talks and the international attempt to
end the nuclear weapons program, China is still trading with North Korea. Through
analyzing the data of China’s export trade to North Korea and China’s statements
about North Korea’s nuclear program, I hypothesize that China is more concerned
with domestic stability than a nuclearized North Korea. After obtaining the results
from the data, I will try to explore whether the data supports the realist or the liberal
assumption.
The thesis is divided into six parts. After the introduction part, Part II contains both
realist and liberal theories about nation’s foreign policy, North Korea’s dependence on
China’s economic and diplomatic assistance, and China’s domestic concerns towards
North Korea’s nuclear weapons program in order to maintain internal stability and
economic prosperity (Sutter, 2003). Then, I introduce my research method in detail in
Part III. Part IV examines data on China’s exports to North Korea and China’s
statements about North Korea nuclear program and analyses the correlation between
China and North Korea trade and six-party talks and the correlation between China’s
trade with North Korea and North Korea’s nuclear tests. After that, the discussion
chapter Part V explains the reasons for China’s inconsistency towards North Korea’s
nuclear weapons program and relates the inconsistency to theoretical approach in
order to address the hypothesis. Finally, in Part VI, the thesis concludes with the
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analysis gained from the data and answers the research question, finding that China is
more concerned about the stability of North Korea because of the threat to China’s
North East Border and possible instability in China.
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Literature Review
1. Theoretical Literature:
(1) Realist Theory:
Although China is leading the six-party talks and the international attempts to open
up nuclear facilities for international inspections and end the nuclear weapons
program, China is still trading with North Korea, which indicates the hypocrisy of
China’s response to North Korea. Therefore, the question of whether China is more
concerned with maintaining domestic stability than a nuclearized North Korea
becomes important. In this thesis, I will use realist and liberal international relations
theories to address the research question.
According to the previous studies, classical realist explanations of international
politics are based on the assumption that states are unitary actors and have the same
foreign policy goals (Ogilvie-White, 1996). The main tenets of realism theory have
been identified as statism, survival and self-help. On the basis of classical realist, the
"neorealist" theory advanced by Waltz (1979) emphasizes that the international
system is anarchy and the distribution of capabilities across units. For Waltz (1979),
since the international system is anarchic (i.e., there is no central authority to protect
states from one another), each state has to survive on its own. Furthermore,
international order, defined as ‘a pattern of activity that sustains the elementary or
primary goals of a society of states, or international society’ is not lacking in
international relations (Bull, 1977). Thus, when analyzing what causes China and the
international community attempts to stop North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, realist
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theories might explain China and the international community attempts to stop North
Korea’s nuclear ambitions as acts of self-preservation and a defense of national
stability. Neither regime type or domestic politics can influence a nation’s foreign
policy in the international system as anarchy.
However, there are many critiques of the assumption that international politics is
anarchic. Ruggie (1982) has argued Waltz’s neo-realist theory of the anarchic
international system cannot explain change and that an explanation must incorporate
other variables such as ‘dynamic density,’ which emphasizes that the density of
interaction is the decisive factor for transition to occur. Ashley (1984) has charged that
Waltz's structural model based on anarchy but loses sight of politics, arguing that the
substantive content of the Chinese conception of national interests is not monolithic or
static, but dynamic and contested. Previous scholars have criticized the positivist
epistemology on state-level used by neo-realists rather than the “post-positivist”
incorporating expanded meanings of security ranging from class, to gender, to post
colonial security.
An important refinement of realism was the addition of offense-defense theory,
according to Walt (1998). Some scholars argued that war was more likely when states
could conquer each other easily. However, when defense was easier than offense,
security was more plentiful, incentives to expand declined, and cooperation could
blossom (Walt, 1998). Thus, if defense had the advantage, then states could acquire
the means to defend themselves without threatening others, dampening the effects of
anarchy at the same time. According to this, it is evident to see that the six-party talks
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and the international community’s economic sanctions towards North Korea’s nuclear
tests can be regarded a means of defending these six nations (North Korea, South
Korea, China, the United States, Japan, and Russia) from regional instability. If
China’s foreign policy is motivated by realist intentions, then China’s trade policy
towards North Korea and the goals of the six-party talks would be the same, since
North Korea with nuclear weapons is an international security risk for China and all
the other nations aim at ending nuclear proliferation at the same time.
(2) Liberal Theory:
In contrast to the realists, traditional liberal theory holds that domestic concerns are
important factors for national security and the international anarchy can be mitigated.
How exactly is domestic politics important in determining states’ foreign policies?
Domestic politics can matter either by causing states to pursue suboptimal foreign
policies, or when differences in states’ political institutions, cultures, economic
structures, or leadership goals unrelated to relative power are causally relevant to
explaining different foreign policy choices according to Fearon (1998). In addition,
Rogowski (1998) also summarized propositions and evidence on how variation in
domestic-political institutions influences five dimensions of states’ foreign policies:
the bias of foreign policy (e.g. toward war or peace, toward free trade or protection);
the credibility of foreign policy commitments; the stability and coherence of a state’s
foreign policy; the ability to mobilize and project power; and domestic actors’
strategies for influencing foreign policy. In the light of the previous studies, we might
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find that some nations are concerned more about domestic social stability than
international anarchy or the balance of power from liberal perspective. In this article,
regional stability and economic prosperity are China’s main domestic concerns, which
can best explain China’s contradiction towards North Korea’s nuclear tests.
Other liberal theories argue that economic interdependence would discourage states
from using force against each other because warfare would threaten each side’s
prosperity (Keohane & Nye, 2000). The economic strand of liberal theory is still
influential as well. In particular, a number of scholars have recently suggested that the
“globalization” of world markets, the rise of transnational networks and
nongovernmental organizations, and the rapid spread of global communications
technology are undermining the power of states and shifting attention away from
military security toward economics and social welfare. Since societies around the
globe become enmeshed in a web of economic and social connections, the costs of
disrupting these ties will effectively preclude unilateral state actions, especially the
use of force according to Keohane and Nye (2000). This perspective implies that
China’s economic sanctions towards North Korea will remain a remote possibility,
since Chinese leaders adopted low-risk approach to most international issues in order
to maintain China’s internal stability and economic prosperity (Sutter, 2003). Thus, if
a country does not follow the liberal theory about economic interdependence, the
powerful denuclearization talks held by the international community might adopt a
perspective that guides the talks, avoiding the use of force and maintaining the
“globalization” of world market.
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In the liberal conception of domestic politics, the state is not an actor but a
representative institution and practices alter “state preferences,” which designates an
ordering among underlying substantive outcomes that may result from international
political interaction (Moravcsik, 1997). Domestic decision making may be structured
so as to generate state preferences that satisfy a strong rationality condition according
to Moravcsik (1997). In addition, Ruggie (1982) and other scholars have observed,
the nature and intensity of national support for any state purpose - even apparently
fundamental concerns like the defense of political and legal sovereignty, territorial
integrity, national security, or economic welfare- varies decisively with the social
context. In this article, China’s domestic concerns for a stable North Korea and
China’s continuing trade with North Korea manifest China’s state preference: national
security.
Liberal theories identify the instruments that states can use to achieve shared
interests, highlight the powerful economic forces with which states and societies must
now contend, and help us understand why states may differ in their basic preferences.
In this article, I will try to find whether China is more concerned with domestic
stability than a nuclearized North Korea through analyzing China’s statements about
North Korea’s nuclear program and the statistics of China’s export trade to North
Korea.
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2. Contextual Literature:
(1) Six-party talks and China’s Response:
The six-party talks play an important role in stopping North Korea’s nuclear
ambitions. In 1994, China did not take the lead in bringing North Korea to the
negotiating table, as it viewed that chiefly as America’s responsibility (Moore, 2008).
Subsequently, it became apparent that the Agreed Framework in 1994 had broken
down. While North Korea was proceeding with its weapons programs by the early
2000s, China began to take a more active international role in seeking a solution to the
North Korean dilemma. The moves culminated in the six-party talks, comprising
North Korea, South Korea, China, the United States, Japan, and Russia (Moore, 2008).
Because of the nuclear proliferation of North Korea, ‘China very directly exerted its
energy to kick off multilateral talks concerning the North Korean nuclear crisis’ in
order to maintain China’s economic and political interests (Chou, 2005). China began
by hosting talks between the United States and the North Korea in 2003 and took the
lead in arranging and again hosting several rounds of six-party talks since 2003,
aiming at ending North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.
Even though China is reluctant to interfere in the internal affairs of a neighboring
state, Chinese leaders officially state their support for maintaining a nuclear-free
Korean Peninsula. The six-party talks can just reveal China’s change and its official
position towards North Korea’s nuclear tests. When North Korea’s nuclear test came
on October 9, 2006, it is apparent to see that China’s response was swift. Officially,
China condemned ‘The DPRK ignored the universal opposition of the international
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community and flagrantly conducted the nuclear test on October 9. The Chinese
government is resolutely opposed to it’ (People’s Daily, 2006). The word ‘flagrantly’
here is ‘hanran’ in Chinese, and is normally reserved in its use in the official Chinese
lexicon for China’s enemies or rivals, historical examples being when the Japanese
prime minister visited the Yasukuni Shrine, or the when the United States bombed the
Chinese Embassy in Belgrade (Kahn, 2006). According to the research, simply the use
of world “flagrantly” alone could manifest the change of “lips and teeth” relationships
between China and North Korea. In addition, on October 14, 2006, China displayed
its displeasure by standing with the other members of the UNSC in passing a
resolution to denounce North Korea’s nuclear test. China's ambassador to the UN
even calls for ‘punitive actions’ against the North Korea (Savage, 2006), which also
suggest the change of China’s response towards North Korea indeed.
Moreover, after the nuclear test, China was reported to have been searching trucks
crossing the North Korea - China borders, but China has not been keen on searching
ships at sea, for fear that such searches could provoke armed conflicts with North
Korea (Lee, 2006). It was also reported that China has instructed its four largest banks
to halt all financial transactions with North Korea after the nuclear test. ‘All
transactions are blocked, whether it is company-to-company or person-to-person’,
said a Bank of China employee in Northeast China (Fairclough and King, 2006).
Although China’s military response to nuclear tests in North Korea would require
further discussion and votes at the Security Council, and that inspections of North
Korean cargo ships or vehicles were voluntary, its seriousness about its opposition to
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the North Korea’s moves cannot be doubted. Beijing’s anger was sufficiently aroused
by Pyongyang’s anti-Chinese behavior for China to change its mind and become an
active participant.
(2) International Community’s Response:
Due to North Korea’s continuous nuclear provocations, international communities
take action to punish North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. The most plausible
explanation for the motivation of North Korea nuclear tests is that North Korea
concluded that ownership of nuclear weapons was necessary to ensure its
political-economic survival as a bargaining chip in dealing with the United States
(Kwak, 2003). From the view of North Korea, the nuclear tests can not only be
regarded as a warning to the United States against a preemptive attack on North Korea,
but also an attempt by North Korea to extract additional economic aid from the United
States and other countries, according to Kwak (2003). In order to stop North Korea’s
nuclear ambitions, international communities condemn and punish North Korea
through different methods.
North Korea’s admission of an enriched uranium program in early October 2002
was the beginning of a nuclear crisis surrounding the Korean peninsula (Kwak, 2003).
Initially, the Bush administration sought to resolve the issue through a peaceful means.
The U.S. condemned North Korea’s nuclear program, demanding that North Korea
must completely dismantle its nuclear weapons program; North Korea must also
allow International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) weapons inspectors’ complete
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access to all nuclear facilities so that disarmament can be monitored and verified; and
North Korea must promise not to export or transfer weapons of mass destruction,
delivery system, or related technologies and materials to any country, group, or
individual (Olsen, 2003). Meanwhile, the Bush Administration had three policy
options towards North Korea’s nuclear tests: (1) dialogue and negotiations with North
Korea, (2) diplomatic isolation and economic sanctions of North Korea, and (3) the
use of military force against North Korea, according to Olsen (2003). According to
the study, the United States’ hard-line policy turned into a major problem for the
peace process of North Korea. Thus, North Korea keeps developing nuclear weapons,
missiles and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) for its own security guarantee.
In addition, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) on
November 14, 2002, announced the suspension of heavy fuel oil delivery beginning in
December to punish North Korea’s new nuclear weapons program. The U.S., South
Korea, Japan and the European Union voted unanimously to cut off oil shipments to
North Korea until it takes action to dismantle its nuclear program. It is estimated that
KEDO-supplied fuel oil accounts for about 10 percent of North Korea’s total energy
needs. The decision of halting fuel oil shipments causes a huge impact on North
Korea, which is already in an acute energy crisis (Kwak, 2003).
In order to force North Korea to abandon its nuclear development program, the UN
Security Council adopts a containment strategy and recommends economic sanctions
towards North Korea as well. The economic sanctions included bans on the sale to or
export from North Korea of military goods and nuclear or any missile-related items, a
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ban on the sale to North Korea of luxury goods, a financial freeze and travel ban on
anyone related to North Korea’s missile or nuclear programs, and inspections of cargo
coming from or going to North Korea (Savage, 2006). However, China, Russia and
others are unlikely to support the economic sanctions that would be needed to wreck
the North Korean economy. According to Kwak (2003), the economic sanctions may
compel North Korean military leaders to speed up its nuclear armament for its
security guarantee. The sanctions could be also wrong to assume that trilateral
cooperation among the U.S., Japan and South Korea will endure if political isolation
and containment will result in confrontation with North Korea finally. For Japan and
South Korea, they do not want to increase a military crisis on the Korean peninsula as
well. President Kim Dae-jung On December 30, 2002 expressed his objection to the
containment against North Korea and president-elect Roh Moo-hyun shared Kim’s
view about political isolation and economic sanctions of North Korea (Olsen, 2003).
In spite of China’s diplomatic influence on North Korea and cooperation with
international community in the six-party talks to diamante the country, China still
continues the trade with North Korea. China’s hypocrisy in dealing with the North
Korean nuclear proliferation thoroughly manifests its foreign policy towards many
international affairs.
(3) China’s Foreign Policy towards North Korea:
The six-party talks on North Korean nuclear issues have been ongoing since August
2003, which actually have not prevented North Korea from having nuclear weapons at
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all. Nevertheless, the goal of denuclearizing the Korean peninsula has been agreed by
all six countries, including North Korea. Whether these talks will reach that goal is
unclear and uncertain. However, the talks have brought the six countries, or at least
the United States, China, the Republic of Korea, Japan, and Russia, closer in terms of
regional security. All of these six nations have agreed to an official dialogue on a
multilateral security cooperation mechanism in Northeast Asia, which to a large extent
is useful and encouraging (Chu & Lin, 2008).
Beijing has emphasized the importance of the six-party talks, but remains deeply
concerned by the North Korean nuclear program and by the threats posed by massive
refugees’ immigration from North Korea to North East region of China. Also, Beijing
regards its relationship with the U.S. as a crucial consideration in decision-making
about the nuclear proliferation of North Korea, according to Kim (2003). Savage
(2003) agrees with Kim’s (2003) statement, supporting that North Korea’s
belligerence provides a convenient excuse for U.S. troops deployments in the region,
as well as American pursuit of missile defense for itself and its allies. From China’s
standpoint, U.S. military policies ostensibly designed to deter North Korea aggression
are really aimed at containing China and preventing it from realizing its goal of
reunification with Taiwan (Savage, 2003). For China, the greatest challenge to smooth
management of the new Beijing-Pyongyang relationship. China’s diplomacy in the
six-party talks and economic leverage over North Korea also reflect some of China’s
foreign policy such as mutual non-aggression, mutual benefit, and peaceful
coexistence.
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In addition, Kim (2003) and Savage (2003) argue that North Korea can provoke
and threaten some of the most fundamental interests of China. According to Kim and
Lee (2002), Moore (2008), and Snyder (2009), they conclude three main ways,
through which North Korea’s weapons programs will threaten China’s interests. First,
North Korea’s continuous nuclear weapons program could provoke a military
intervention from the United States and/or other powers, which prevents China from
gaining a peaceful regional environment for its own continued development. Secondly,
North Korea’s relative isolation and international military action or comprehensive
sanctions against North Korea challenge China’s version for multilateral economic
and security cooperation based on “mutual interest and common prosperity.” Thirdly,
a collapse of North Korea could create massive immigration of North Korean refugees,
which might be a potential threat to the security of China’s borders.
Above all, North Korean nuclear actions could cause major economic disruption in
Chinese markets and social instability in East Asia because of war or comprehensive
sanctions against North Korea (Kim and Lee 2002; Moore 2008; Snyder 2009).
Consequently, these threats to a large extent can be considered as the main reasons
why it is highly unlikely that China will support any sanctions policy that the United
States brings to the UN Security Council. Since China has the largest border with
North Korea, without China’s support, any sanctions policy is doomed to fail.
Moreover, the threats to China’s national interests can explain the puzzle why China
is still trading with North Korea as a leading member in the six-party talks. China
attempts to avoid the collapse of North Korea for the purpose of maintaining China’s
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own national interests: internal security and territorial integrity.
Since China has been the dominant provider of aid and partner in trade with North
Korea, China’s own economic development gave it the ability to harness new
economic instruments to gain political leverage in its relationship with North Korea
(Snyder, 2009). As long as North Korea was receiving external economic subsidies, it
would participate in the six-party talks, but North Korea’s participation rarely resulted
in concrete progress towards the objective of denuclearization. China is reported to
have provided economic aid and energy assistance worth as much as US$50 million
to secure North Korean in February 2004 (Kim, 2006).
China also increased investment in infrastructure projects along the Sino-North
Border beginning in 2005. The bridge from Helong, in China, to Musan, where North
Korea’s iron mines are located, was reported to have been upgraded to support
Chinese investment estimated at about US$500 million. In addition, China is reported
to have invested in the Hyesan copper mine, the Manp’o zinc mine, and the
Hoeryo’ng gold mine (Gomi, 2005). The highest-profile evidence of China’s efforts to
use politically directed investment as a form of assistance was China’s financing and
construction of the Tae’an glass factory, through which to enhance China’s political
leverage and influence on leaders in Pyongyang (Snyder, 2009). This type of
investment may be useful as a means of providing assistance to North Korea, and has
been used to promote China’s economic and political stability according to Snyder
(2009). Thus, the findings of these scholars may suggest that China attempts to bolster
its economic leverage over North Korea, which manifests that China’s domestic
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concerns indeed influence its foreign policy.
(4) China’s Domestic Stability Concerns:
War or serious conflict involving North Korea could cause a disruption of trade and
investment in the region, which could be devastating to Chinese economic
development and ultimately shake China’s domestic political stability. If the
disruption prolonged, it could even threaten the rule of the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP), because the CCP’s legitimacy today rests primarily on successful economic
development (Moore, 2008).
If there is no domestic stability, then there is no CCP. Currently, China’s domestic
economy is in a very sensitive period of development. A Chinese scholar Yu (2005)
has said, ‘China is in a phase where instability from domestic contradictions is a
frequent occurrence’ because of ‘the transition from a centrally planned to a market
economy’. Therefore, ‘if it is not handled well, it can bring about social unrest’ (Yu,
2005). Actually the CCP fears social instability very much and aims at achieving both
regional and national economic growth. In this regard, domestic stability for China
means to maintain security and peace, and avoid mass unrest such as strikes, protests
and anti-government activities. Therefore, the CCP is watching North Korea’s
situation closely. If China’s economy is battered and/or stalls due to the disruption of
North Korea, the CCP will face a huge breakdown in the economy, which could bring
those unemployed populations and the poor out into the streets (Yu, 2005). Meanwhile,
the pursuit of national interests is the legitimate goal of a state’s foreign policy
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according to Deng (1998). During the 1990s, China’s conception of national interests
was closely related to sovereignty, territorial integrity, trading behavior, human rights
and regional security multilateralism (Deng, 1998).
China has its own interests in promotion of domestic and regional stability. In order
to achieve those objectives, China would be willing to consider the economic
instruments for domestic concerns, which were closely linked to the politics of
managing the Sino-North Korean relationship (Snyder, 2009). The late 1990s marked
a transition to a new stage in China’s conceptualization of its foreign policy priorities.
China’s “new security concept” and “peaceful rise” were increasingly premised on the
idea that continued economic development, external orientation, and integration with
the outside world gave it greater responsibility to secure the regional stability
necessary to perpetuate economic growth (Snyder, 2009). These foreign policy
priorities also revealed contradictions between the premises underlying China’s grand
strategy and its fundamental interests in North Korea.
In Beijing’s view, the greatest danger of maximizing its leverage on North Korea is
from two alternative possibilities: conflict and collapse. China’s junior socialist ally in
the strategic buffer zone could feel so cornered that it fights back, thus triggering an
armed conflict. Alternatively, economic sanctions could produce another collapsing
socialist regime on China’s borders, with huge political, economic, and social
consequences for Chinese domestic politics (Kim and Lee, 2002). Thus, according to
the study, China will be more committed to the immediate challenge of maintaining
stability than its long-term objective of nuclear disarmament on the Korean Peninsula.
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In addition, a more recent elaboration of the new foreign policy is the idea of the
“harmonious world” elaborated by Hu Jintao in September 15, 2005 (Yuan, 2007). Hu
proposed “respecting the right of all countries to choose their own social system and
development road, strengthening dialogue and exchanges between different
civilizations, upholding the diversity of civilizations, promoting democratization of
international relations, and making concerted efforts to build a harmonious world
incorporating civilizations of a diverse nature.” Yuan (2007) claims that the
“harmonious world” idea emphasizes the replacement of “struggle” with “harmony”
in management of China’s international relations and China still focuses on major
national interests rather than ideology as core principle underlying China’s diplomacy.
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Method
This study utilized a series of official documents, newspaper articles and data on
Chinese exports and trade with North Korea to measure the extent to which China
shared goals with the international community. I also examined trade data to analyze
how China characterized concerns about North Korea’s nuclear programs.
At the very beginning, I collected media reports from 2007 to 2011 about the
six-party talks from BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific - Political, which is supplied by
BBCWorldwide Monitoring1. I chose BBC Monitoring database because it not only
gets the latest Asian news, but also selects and translates information from radio,
television, press, news agencies and the Internet from 150 countries in more than 70
languages. The data is official governmental statements from China and other
countries. The BBC Monitoring’s reports about six-party talks provide different
nations’ statements released by South Korea’s Yonhap News Agency, Russia’s RIA,
Japan’s Kyodo News Agency, China’s Xinhua News Agency, Hong Kong - based News
Agency Zhongguo Tongxun She, and the China edition of CCTV-4’s program “Today’s
Focus.” Moreover, the BBC also reports many bilateral talks between the U.S. and
Japan, and Japan and South Korea about North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.
The statements of each nation about the six-party talks can reveal not only each
nation’s attitude towards North Korea’s nuclear issue distinctly, but also China’s
shared goals with the international community.
In addition, I collected transcripts from the six-party talks to look for statements by
1 I got the information through the University of Kansas library databases.
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China and the international community. I also searched the dates of all the six-party
talks, dates of all the North Korean nuclear tests, and what kind of sanctions the
countries involved in the talks suggest to North Korea. These sources come from
China’s Xinhua Net, which is the Communist Party and Chinese central government’s
official channel for the distribution of news. After that, I translated all the reports and
Chinese official statements from Chinese into English.
Combined with the media reports I found from BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific -
Political, I collected 14 documents containing direct statements from China and the
international community in the six-party talks regarding North Korea’s nuclear
program. On the basis of these 14 documents, I created a table and categorized all of
China and the international community’s statements concerning the denuclearization
of North Korea into three main types: supportive statements, neutral statements, and
non-supportive statements to the denuclearization. I utilized each category to examine
political rhetoric. For example, the U.S. claimed “North Korea must primarily give up
its nuclear weapons program2” at the end of the first round, showing its supportive
response towards the denuclearization of North Korea. China asserted “the six-party
talks should end with peace3” at the end of the first round instead of focusing on
denuclearizing North Korea, revealing its neutral attitude towards the issue. However,
a non-supportive statement is one in which the country claims no problem exists or no
action is needed. Although there is no non-supportive response found from the
transcript of the six-party talks, I still used it to show the so-called shared goals of all
2 Source: China’s Xinhua Net
3 Ibid
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the six-party members to dismantle North Korea. Subsequently, I calculated the
number of supportive, neutral, and non-supportive statements that appeared in these
14 documents and compared the findings from the political rhetoric research with
China’s actual trade data. Finally, I examined China’s consistency, change, or
contradiction over the North Korea issue according to the totals.
To obtain official data on Chinese exports and trade with North Korea, I searched
the website China Data Online and found China and North Korea’s trade data among
thousands of China’s national statistics. I downloaded China’s official documents
from the website and set up two figures to examine the correlation between China’s
export trade to North Korea and China’s stance on North Korea at the six-party talks
from 2003 to 2007, and the correlation between China’s export trade to North Korea
and North Korea’s nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, and 2013, respectively. I selected
China Data Online for the research because it is the primary data source for China
studies and the largest source of longitudinal trade data released by the government.
Finally, I searched the University of Kansas library databases and found some other
resources from The New York Times, The States News Service, and The USA Today for
the information about Chinese leaders’ concern over North Korea’s domestic stability.
The New York Times has been regarded as a national "newspaper of record" with high
credibility and authority, which is also the representative of newspaper with
seriousness in the United States. Meanwhile, both The States News Service and The
USA Today are well-known newspapers and provide objective reports from different
perspectives. Different nations’ newspaper articles in different periods may provide
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views from different perspectives towards the issue of North Korea’s nuclear tests. I
collected 6 articles from these newspapers. Some of these articles support that China
is concerned more about its regional peace and security. Others maintain that the
reason why China focuses on domestic stability is because China wants to limit the
power of U.S. as a kind of diplomatic strategy. Even though there are some
differences among these arguments, all of them emphasize the importance of domestic
stability in China. Therefore, these resources can help explain why China is leading
the six-party talks, yet still trading with North Korea.
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Results &Analysis
This chapter contains the results and data analysis of China and the international
community’s statements in the six-party talks and China’s exports to North Korea
from 1995 to 2010. The findings might help us determine whether China is more
concerned with its own national interests than North Korean nuclear proliferation.
North Korea’s admission of an enriched uranium program in 2002 represented the
beginning of a nuclear crisis surrounding the Korean peninsula. North Korea
attempted to utilize nuclear weapons as a bargaining chip to ensure its
political-economic survival. Thus, the six-party talks were held in order to stop North
Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Although China and the international community aimed at
ending the nuclear weapons program in North Korea, some of their stances were
inconsistent due to the complicated political and economic situations. The following
part will analyze the inconsistency in detail.
As shown in Table 1, China made 8 supportive statements and 5 neutral statements
about the denuclearization of North Korea in total. Meanwhile, the international
community made 47 supportive statements and 5 neutral statements regarding the
denuclearization issue in all. According to the available materials, it is evident to see
that both China and the international community have never made any non-supportive
statements about the denuclearization of North Korea in the talks. Moreover, we can
find from the table that the neutral response of China and the international community
in the fifth and sixth rounds appeared more frequently than before.
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Table 1: China and the International Community’s Response to North Korean
Denuclearization in the Six-party Talks
Response
Six-party Talks
Supportive Neutral Non-supportive
First Round
(2003. 8.)
China 0 1 0
International Community 2 2 0
Second Round
(2004. 2.)
China 1 0 0
International Community 4 0 0
Third Round
(2004. 6.)
China 0 1 0
International Community 4 0 0
Fourth Round
(2005. 7. & 9. )
China 1 0 0
International Community 4 0 0
Fifth Round
(2005. 11. &
2006. 12. &
2007. 2.)
China 3 2 0
International Community 18 1 0
Sixth Round
(2007. 3. & 9. )
China 3 1 0
International Community 15 2 0
Source: China’s Xinhua Net
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This data on China and the international community’s response to North Korean
denuclearization in the six-party talks suggests that China’s leaders did have shared
goals with the international community to stop North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and
end North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. For example, the U.S. officially insisted
“North Korea must give up its nuclear weapons program4” in the first round of the
six-party talks. In the second round of the talks, South Korea also asserted “North
Korea should completely abandon its nuclear weapons program and the U.S. must
guarantee its security.5” Moreover, during the fourth round of the talks, the six parties
unanimously reaffirmed “the goal of the six-party talks is the verifiable
denuclearization of the Korean peninsula in a peaceful manner6.” According to these
statements from the talks, the use of words such as “must,” “completely,”
“unanimously,” and “verifiable” reveals China and the international community’s firm
resolution of the denuclearization in North Korea.
Even though the six-party talks have stalled since 2007, bilateral and /or
multilateral consultations similar to the six-party talks have still continued. After the
last round of the six-party talks, US President Barack Obama agreed to cooperate
closely with Japan towards North Korea’s denuclearization through the six-party talks
on Jan. 29, 2009. The third phase of the bilateral talks between the U.S. and Japan
calls for North Korea to dismantle its nuclear facilities and programs in exchange for
massive economic aid and diplomatic recognition by Washington and Tokyo. Obama
and US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton have said that they will continue the
4 Source: China’s Xinhua Net
5 Ibid
6 Ibid
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six-party talks while seeking more direct engagement with the reclusive,
nuclear-armed communist state7.
Based on the available data, China and the international community’s supportive
stances on denuclearizing North Korea can be shown through their condemnation
towards North Korea’s conducting its third nuclear test on Feb. 12, 2013. The test
elicited condemnation and indignation from several countries and leaders, including
United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the U.S. and China. The secretary-general
of the UN, Ban Ki-moon, condemned the underground nuclear weapon test conducted
by North Korea and claimed that it was deplorable that Pyongyang defied the strong
and unequivocal call from the international community to refrain from any further
provocative measures. US President Barack Obama asserted the danger posed by
North Korea’s threatening activities warrants further swift and credible action by the
international community. As shown through this political rhetoric, the results reveal
China and the international community’s firm determination of dismantling North
Korea’s nuclear facilities and programs.
However, we can find that China still maintained neutral four times during the
six-party talks towards North Korea’s nuclear issues. For instance, China said “the
six-party talks should end with peace8” at the end of the first round. In the third round,
China said “the six-party talks should consider North Korea’s nuclear weapons
program’s impact on China’s national security.9” In the fifth round of the talks, China
made two neutral statements towards the denuclearization of North Korea. This is
7 Source: Yonhap News Agency
8 Source: China’s Xinhua Net
9 Ibid
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mainly because United Nations Security Council had imposed economic sanctions on
North Korea, which might lead to collapse of the region and threaten China’s
domestic security. Since North Korea announced a successful nuclear test on October
9, 2006, the United Nations Security Council, in response, passed Resolution 1718,
unanimously condemning North Korea. The sanctions ranged from the economic to
the trade of military units, weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-related parts and
technology transfer, and a ban on certain luxury goods10. However, both China and
Russia were quick to stress that these were not military-enforceable sanctions. Then
China blocked the United Nations Security Council from condemning North Korea’s
dangerous behavior, and China’s foreign minister vowed that China intended to
remain neutral11. In sum, these analyses suggest China’s inconsistency and
contradiction on the denuclearization of North Korea, emphasizing China’s domestic
concerns at the same time.
Source: China Data Online
10 Source: The New York Times
11 Ibid
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With China’s huge economy and rapid rate of growth, China has become the key to
North Korea’s economic relations with the outside world. China’s major exports to
North Korea include food aids, oil, machinery, electrical machinery, vehicles, plastic,
iron and steel. China’s major imports from North Korea include mineral fuels, ores,
woven apparel, iron and steel, fish and seafood.
Not only is China the main trading partner of North Korea, but China has become a
critical player in the implementation of economic sanctions on North Korea. For
example, in 2009, China provided about half of all North Korean imports and
received a quarter of its exports (Nanto & Manyin, 2010). As shown in Figure 1,
China’s export trade with North Korea has been rising steadily. Although North Korea
and China’s foreign trade in 1998 decreased by 33.8 percent over the previous year,
since 2001 it has recovered up the level of 1995. According to the data, China’s export
trade with North Korea in 2010 was US$2,277 million in total, an increase of 368.5
percent of the trade since 1995. The dramatic rise in exports demonstrates an overall
increase in China’s trade with North Korea.
However, the UN Security Council condemned North Korea due to the third
nuclear test through passing economic sanctions resolution on October 9, 2006. China
not only remained neutral towards the sanctions but also continued trading with North
Korea since then. Figure 1 shows that China’s export trade to North Korea in 2007
amounted to US$1,392 million, an increase of nearly 13 percent of the trade in 2006
and an increase of 121.7 percent of the trade in 2003. However, heedless of the
international community’s resolutions and China’s continuing trade assistance, North
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Korea still conducted its first nuclear test in 2006 during the fifth round of the talks.
This test manifests that the six-party talks indeed failed to stop North Korea’s nuclear
ambitions.
Source: China Data Online
According to Figure 2, we can find that China not only fails to impose the
economic sanctions on North Korea, but continues trading with North Korea even
after its first and second nuclear tests. As China sought to enhance its political
influence on North Korea beginning in 2003, its share of North Korea’s overall trade
reached 33 percent that year, and has continued to rise since then, to over 43 percent
in 2005. China has become North Korea’s external lifeline and major source of
economic exchange.
In addition to the economic cooperation, Chinese scholars reported that China has
adopted a three-point policy for economic cooperation with North Korea based on the
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principle of “mutual benefit.12” These principles were discussed during Hu’s visit to
Pyongyang in October 2005, and again when Kim visited China in January 200613.
The first principle is strengthened government-to-government exchanges and
cooperation. The second is expanded reliance on market mechanisms. And the third is
a leading role for enterprises in economic cooperation between the two countries.
Therefore, China’s economic engagement with North Korea might be utilized in
various ways to achieve various political objectives.
According to China’s trade with North Korea, we can find that China attempted to
denuclearize North Korea in exchange for a massive foreign aid through trade rather
than economic sanctions. However, North Korea conducted its first nuclear test on
Oct. 9, 2006 and second on May 25, 2009. The data also shows that Sino-North
Korean trade increased by almost 13 percent during 2007 compared to 2006, and 20.7
percent during 2010 compared to 2009, coinciding with China’s increased diplomatic
mediation efforts. The overall upward trend of China and North Korea’s trade appears
to serve as a barometer for the relative health of political relations between the two
countries. In sum, the results suggest that there existed inconsistency between China’s
firm opposition towards the nuclear proliferation of North Korea and China’s actual
trade assistance to North Korea.
The inconsistency of China’s response towards North Korea’s nuclear tests also
gave rise to many debates about whether they initiated sanctions. South Korean
Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan said “We are expecting China to explain the details
12 Author conversations and interviews with Chinese North Korea specialists in Beijing, February 2006.
13 Ibid
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of its economic cooperation programs with North Korea and whether they violated the
Security Council resolutions (Choe, 2009).” Mr. Yu described Beijing’s diplomacy as
a combination of sanctions and engagement arising out of a concern that isolation and
pressure alone would drive North Korea to strengthen its nuclear weapons programs.
In contrast, even though China’s trade and aid have become more crucial to North
Korea’s survival, some analysts say that China’s influence over North Korea may be
overstated according to Choe (2009). Bruce Klingner, senior research fellow at the
Heritage Foundation, said “China has long sought to parlay economic engagement
into political influence over North Korea,” and “Beijing’s efforts, however, have been
for naught. Despite extensive Chinese government’s business engagement, the
Chinese leadership was unable to persuade North Korea to abandon either nuclear
weapons program nor prevent long-range missile launches and nuclear tests in 2006
and 2009.14” China has long made it clear that it is concerned with the stability on its
border and within its territory.
Based on the available data, there seems to be a close relationship between China’s
trade with North Korea and Chinese leaders’ concern over North Korea’s domestic
stability. After the bilateral talks between China and North Korea in Oct. 2009, the
article China Aims to Steady North Korea reported by The New York Times claimed
“North Korea’s reversal of returning to the six-party talks came after China signed a
series of agreements that promised aid for North Korea and an expansion in economic
exchanges, including the construction of another bridge across their tightly controlled
14 Source: The New York Times
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river border.15” Although China has always regarded North Korea as a buffer against
American influence in the region, China acknowledges that avoiding an implosion by
North Korea is more important. Otherwise, it would endanger the stability of its own
border area16. Han Suk-hee, an expert on Chinese-North Korean relations at the
Graduate School of International Studies at Yonsei University in Seoul, asserted that
the response of China in the bilateral talks shows that China’s foremost concern is to
secure stability in North Korea17. Han said “The deals they signed are aimed at
ensuring stability in North Korea even after Kim Jong-il is gone. China effectively
announced that it did not agree with the United States and South Korea on sanctions
against North Korea.18” In addition, the article China Aims to Steady North Korea also
claimed that the joint announcement gave China something on the nuclear front to
show the world - if only a vaguely worded promise to possibly return to the talks -
that might ease international pressure on it to do more on North Korea19. Thus,
China’s continuing trade with North Korea reveals its domestic concerns for a stable
North Korea and the social stability.
On January 8, 2012, Assistant Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin conducted an
exclusive interview with the Xinhua News Agency, and introduced the Asian situation
and China's diplomatic work with neighboring countries in 2011 and described the
direction of Chinese diplomacy with Asian countries in 2012. Liu claimed that China
has actively communicated with all the related parties, including North Korea, and
15 Source: The New York Times
16 Source: The New York Times
17 Ibid
18 Ibid
19 Ibid
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clearly elaborated China’s concerns of supporting North Korea’s stable development
and maintaining peace and stability of the Peninsula and Northeast Asia. He said
“China always pays close attention to the situation on the Korean Peninsula and
consistently upholds that the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue be solved through
dialogue and consultations and in peaceful ways.20” It is the consistent principle of
both the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese government to consolidate and
develop the cooperative relations with North Korea21. Liu also said “Holding
presidency of the six-party talks, China will continue to promote peace talks and work
with all the related parties to play a constructive role of advancing the six-part talks
process and build lasting peace and tranquility on the Peninsula and in Northeast
Asia.22” In addition, China is planning to carry forward the spirit of "tradition
inheritance, future orientation, good-neighborly friendship and strengthening
cooperation" to pass on and develop Sino-North Korean relations,23 which manifests
that China will not sanction North Korea economically and even continue the trade
with North Korea due to domestic stability concerns. According to these newspaper
sources, we can find that Chinese leaders concern more over a stable North Korea and
China’s domestic stability than a nuclearized North Korea.
20 Source: Xinhua News Agency
21 Ibid
22 Ibid
23 Ibid
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Discussion
According to previous data analysis, I find inconsistency in China’s response
towards North Korean nuclear actions. That is, China undermined the international
community’s attempt to enforce sanctions. For instance, China blocked the United
Nations Security Council from condemning North Korea’s dangerous behavior and
China’s foreign minister vowed that China intended to remain neutral.
Since CCP fears China’s social instability both regionally and nationally, China
always puts its domestic stability in the first place. However, China has consistently
taken a stand against North Korean nuclear tests. Even though China believes that
North Korea’s stability is one of the most significant preconditions of China’s
domestic security, the results of the research shows that both the six-party talks and
China’s trade assistance towards North Korea failed to achieve the denuclearization
goals when North Korea conducted its nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, and 2013.
In contrast to the realist which supports that states are unitary actors and all of them
have the same foreign policy goals (Ogilvie-White, 1996), the current study finds that
domestic politics can influence a nation’s foreign policy in the international system.
Such economic sanctions may compel North Korean military leaders to speed up the
country’s nuclear armament for its security guarantee, according to Kwak (2003).
Moreover, the reason why China is unlikely to support the economic sanctions on
North Korea is that the sanctions would wreck the North Korean economy and
threaten China’s own national interests. Therefore, domestic politics can influence a
nation’s foreign policy.
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Instead, the results of this study are consistent with liberal theory, which proposes
that domestic politics can matter by causing states to pursue suboptimal foreign
policies (Fearon, 1998). Even though the Chinese government expressed its firm
opposition to North Korea’s third nuclear test and showed its firm stance to realize the
denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and prevent nuclear proliferation, China
blocked the United Nations Security Council from condemning and sanctioning North
Korea’s dangerous behavior, and China’s foreign minister vowed that China intended
to remain neutral towards the issue. China’s neutral response reveals that China’s real
objective of participating in the six-party talks actually differs from the international
community.
Instead of denuclearizing North Korea, China’s main objective is to maintain
domestic stability. For China, North Korean nuclear actions could cause major
economic disruption in Chinese markets and social insecurity in China because of war
or comprehensive sanctions against North Korea (Kim and Lee 2002; Moore 2008;
Snyder 2009). There are many reasons for China to hold neutral response towards the
sanctions over North Korea. While China supports the goal of denuclearization of
North Korea, it is not prepared to cooperate with the U.S. in pushing for regime
change in Pyongyang. This is because “regime change” conjures up several
associations in Beijing, none of which are pleasant. The economic sanctions policy is
likely to increase the flow of North Korean refugees into China, complicating an
already difficult situation. According to Savage (2003), setting up refugee camps, as
some activists have called on China to do, might lead to risks encouraging greater
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in-migration and a large number of ethnic Koreans residing in the area, and it would
be difficult for Chinese authorities to control the movements of the refugees.
According to Chinese academics, only putting the refugee count at less than 1,000, a
number that the ethnic Korean community in China might be able to absorb.
Otherwise, the flows of refugees will put stress on the local Korean-Chinese
community to provide food to help starving relatives in North Korea (Snyder, 1997).
Even after coming to Chinese territory, North Korea’s refugees have few options
available to ensure their survival. According to Snyder (1997), those North Korean
refugees usually cannot speak Chinese and are easily distinguished from local
populations. Moreover, Northeastern China has its own problems with unemployment
and the “floating population” of unemployed Chinese, which further limits survival
options for the North Korean refugee population. If the refugee immigration really
comes true, the situation will undoubtedly prevent China from gaining a peaceful
regional environment for its own continued development. In sum, China’s response is
also consistent with the liberal assumption that China adopted a low-risk approach to
most international issues in order to maintain China’s internal stability and economic
prosperity (Sutter, 2003).
According to the research, I find that China’s political rhetoric and the neutral
response in and about the talks show its strong domestic stability concern as well.
This kind of concern is proposed and emphasized by many scholars as well. For
instance, Snyder (2009) claims that China’s “new security concept” and “peaceful
rise” were increasingly premised on the idea that continued economic development,
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external orientation, and integration with the outside world, which underline the
significance of internal stability in China. In Beijing’s view, the greatest danger of
maximizing its leverage on North Korea is from two alternative possibilities: conflict
and collapse. China’s junior socialist ally in the strategic buffer zone could feel so
cornered that it fights back, thus triggering an armed conflict. Kim and Lee (2002)
support that economic sanctions could produce another collapsing socialist regime on
China’s borders, with huge political, economic, and social consequences for Chinese
domestic politics. Considering these alternative possibilities, Yuan (2007) also claims
that China sticks to the “harmonious world” idea, focusing on the replacement of
“struggle” with “harmony” in management of China’s international relations and
China’s major national interests rather than ideology as core principle underlying
China’s diplomacy. All of these arguments manifest China’s domestic concerns rather
than international and regional concerns.
I also find that China attempts to utilize trade cooperation with North Korea for its
own political stability and economic prosperity. The finding just fits in with Walt’s
(1998) study, which asserts that economic interdependence would discourage states
from using force against each other, because warfare would threaten each side’s
prosperity. Different types of investment and foreign aid may be useful as a means of
providing assistance to North Korea, and have been used to promote China’s
economic and political stability, according to Snyder (2009). The results of this study
are also in accordance with Wang’s (1999) findings of China’s development interest
and need is serving the goal of domestic economic construction and seeking a
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relatively stable external environment conducive to reform and development. In this
regard, China’s participation in the six-party talks can be regarded as a method for
China to seek a relatively stable external environment, in which China ostensibly
shares the goals with the international community to denuclearize North Korea.
However, China actually aims at maintaining domestic stability. Both China’s refusal
to sanction North Korea economically and China’s continuing trade with North Korea
reveal China’s domestic politics and its domestic concerns at the same time, which
always influence China’s foreign policies. According to China’s foreign policy, we
can find that China emphasizes the sovereignty interest and need is to protect the
territory, borders, and basic sovereignty from encroachment. This is the reason why
Beijing has highlighted the significance of dialogue in resolving the standoff of North
Korean nuclear issue, but remains deeply concerned by the threats posed by refugees
from North Korea to the stability of its own Communist political system. Furthermore,
Beijing considers relations with the United States as a paramount consideration in
decision-making about the crisis. However, China fails to exercise positive influence
in the Asia Pacific region because of China’s inconsistency between its political
rhetoric and actual trade data with North Korea.
Unlike the study of Snyder (2009), who believes that China’s own economy gave it
the ability to harness new economic instruments to gain political leverage in its
relationship with North Korea, the results of the current research suggest that China’s
economic instruments fail to end North Korean nuclear tests. North Korea ignored the
universal opposition its nuclear weapons program and flagrantly conducted nuclear
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tests in 2006, 2009, and 2013. China’s trade assistance to North Korea does not stop
North Korean nuclear ambitions. The most plausible explanation for the motivation of
North Korea nuclear tests is that North Korea concluded that ownership of nuclear
weapons was necessary to ensure its political-economic survival as a bargaining chip
in dealing with the United States. Moreover, from North Korea’s perspective, the
nuclear tests can not only be regarded as a warning to the United States against a
preemptive attack on North Korea, but also an attempt by North Korea to extract
additional economic aid from the United States and other countries, according to
Kwak (2003). To a certain extent, North Korea does not believe that China’s trade
assistance can prevent the international community’s economic sanctions or the
United States’ military attack. In order to guarantee the survival and security of North
Korea, North Korea chose to extract foreign aid from the international community and
continue its nuclear tests at the same time.
Finally, we come to the research question of this thesis. Is China more concerned
with domestic stability than a nuclearized North Korea? We find that China follows
the liberal theory and we also observe a contradiction between China’s trade with
North Korea and the goals of the six-party talks. China is more concerned about the
stability of North Korea because of the threat to China’s North East border and
possible instability in China. The findings of the study also support the hypothesis that
China concerns more over a stable North Korea and China’s domestic stability than a
nuclearized North Korea.
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Conclusion
According to the results and analysis of this study, we can conclude that the
long-term goal of China’s foreign policy is to become a responsible superpower, while
the current and short-term goals are to focus on domestic concerns such as resolving
political and economic problems and establishing a relatively stable external
environment, in which to advance its own national development.
The study reveals that China’s foreign policy toward North Korea is aimed at
maintaining the stability of the region as a part of creating this stable environment.
Even though China’s ties with North Korea might not be as close as before, North
Korea will continue to be one of the most significant considerations in China’s
decision-making of foreign policy. China’s leading role in the six-party talks,
objecting to economic sanctions on North Korea, and continuing trade with the region
clearly indicate China’s intentions concerning the North Korean nuclear issue.
According to the research, we observe a contradiction between China’s trade with
North Korea and the goals of the six-party talks, which reveals that China’s domestic
politics and domestic concerns influence its foreign policy in liberal terms. However,
the results of the study also show that the Sino-North Korean relationship is
increasingly based on the principles of reciprocity and national interest, which is
leading to a decline in North Korea’s political dependence on China. North Korea’s
continuous nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, and 2013 just show the limitation of China’s
influence in the six-party talks and trade assistance towards North Korea.
All in all, it is evident that although China has more influence over North Korea
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than the United States, Japan, South Korea, and Russia, China is still more concerned
with domestic stability than a nuclearized North Korea. If China were to use all the
instruments it has at its disposal to bring pressure to bear on North Korea, it would
endanger its larger strategic objectives for the region due to the complexity of the
political and security situation in Northeast Asia. Even if China condemns North
Korea’s nuclear tests, it does not mean that China will cease its trade with North
Korea. China’s pragmatic approach reflects its own interest in stability and in the
promotion of economic development. Moreover, after the third nuclear test in 2013,
North Korea declared that it would never join talks on giving up its nuclear weapons
until the entire world became weapons-free. Therefore, China’s influence over North
Korea is limited, and China will not take any action to escalate the situation in North
Korea in order to prevent instability or even the collapse of North Korea.
In this regard, the careful examination of findings address the hypothesis and
answer the research question. China’s national strategy focusing on maintaining
domestic stability can be applied in analyzing some other international issues. In
addition, there are still some limitations of the study that may affect the validity or the
generalizability of the results. Thus, more data analysis and official documents should
be collected and examined for the further research.
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